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India-Pakistan relations: Are nuclear weapons an obstacle to a conventional war between India and Pakistan?

 India-Pakistan relations: Are nuclear weapons an obstacle to a 

the conventional war between India and Pakistan?


In the scorching sun of June 2002, the mood and atmosphere at the missile launch site in Jhelum were depressing. The reason was that the military tension with India had reached a very dangerous level.

Conflict Between India and Pakistan | Global Conflict Tracker, India had deployed its offensive 'Three Strike' Corps near the border, in addition to the heavy contingent of troops lined up along the border with artillery and armor.


The Pakistani evil forces had also completed the counter-alignment, but this movement was costing them dearly. Then Pakistan had less manpower than India while there was a clear difference in both the quality and quantity of arms.

Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations - JSTOR,General Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator who overthrew the democratic government three years ago, the Chief of Army Staff and Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf himself was present at the site in Jhelum from where the missile was to be fired. More than two dozen Kahuta Research Laboratories Scientists use ground-to-ground Ghauri (capable of hitting large urban centers over a distance of more than a thousand kilometers) and Abdali and Ghaznavi (capable of hitting relatively short distances and any military target). Are more suitable for easy targeting) were there to begin the test process of the missiles.

Are nuclear weapons keeping the India-Pakistan crisis from,The media or anyone other than soldiers and scientists were not allowed to attend the event, but Lt. Gen. Khalid Qadwai, head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD), made sure that General Musharraf A select few must reach Pakistani and international nuclear experts, as excerpts from General Musharraf's speech were later published by a number of national and international media outlets. An international judge and writer also personally thanked General Qadwai in writing for providing these quotations.


India's military advances on Pakistan's eastern border have sounded alarm bells for Pakistan's military leadership since early 2002.

General Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of the Pakistan Army, had ordered the movement of the evil forces. The Pakistan Air Force was also on high alert.

Threats were growing on global borders. On December 18, 2001, India launched 'Operation Prakram' (Courage or Manhood) and deployed attacking troops near the border, including tanks and heavy artillery.

Five days before the start of Operation Prakram, armed militants attacked the Indian Parliament compound, prompting Indian intelligence to accuse the militants of having links to Pakistani intelligence.

The Indian leadership strongly felt that it should initiate disciplinary action against Pakistan.

"Kashmir & Nuclear War" - Federation Of American Scientists,Some of the Indian troops were from Central India and Ambala where the headquarters of the two Indian 'Strike Corps' were located. The total strength of the Indian troops was eight lakhs. With three strike or attacking courses, they had closed the border with Pakistan and India.


Indian Air Force units and satellite airfields had been activated and the Eastern Fleet (air fleet) had been shifted from the Bay of Bengal to the North Arabian Sea to blockade Pakistan along with the Western Air Force.

In this nerve-wracking situation, General Pervez Musharraf categorically said that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if the survival and integrity of our country was threatened.

The Pakistani government has announced that its command and control methods will ensure that its weapons can be used for immediate combat use and remain ready in the event of a crisis.

India–Pakistan Relations: Challenges and Opportunities,In an interview with the influential German magazine Der Spiegel in April 2002, General Musharraf said that Pakistan would rely on conventional weapons for its national security, but especially if Pakistan was in danger of being wiped out. Using is an option.

Conservative analysts believe that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is based on a policy of deliberate weakness or instability aimed at convincing India and the United States that any immediate escalation of tensions over conventional weapons could lead to a nuclear response I can get out. This clear sense of weakness has been manifested in both the Pakistani military and political leadership as Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998 with the decision to detonate.

Nuclear Issues Between India and Pakistan - Stimson Center,Shortly after the bombings, India again entered a state of military aggression as its troops rallied to drive Pakistani troops out of the Kargil peaks.


The Kargil conflict began in April 1999 and once again led to a nuclear crisis. Both sides began threatening each other with an atomic bomb.

In the early stages of the conflict, the threats came from political figures who were not significant and had no involvement in nuclear decision-making on either side of the border. Therefore, these threats were not taken into account.

But then Pakistan's then Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad Khan also jumped into the fray.

In late May, Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad Akhan made the most prominent statement on nuclear weapons during the conflict, warning India that Pakistan could use any type of weapon to defend its geographical integrity.

Enhancing Deterrence Stability on the Subcontinent:, This statement was significant because Pakistan generally maintained the 'focus' of its nuclear doctrine as a last resort, thinking that if it was a matter of state survival, it would think about it. Speaking of the Kargil tensions, Foreign Secretary Shamshad was not the only government official to make a statement on nuclear power during the Kargil war, but also a number of statements by government ministers that were not very sensible. There must have been a statement issued by the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Raja Zafarul Haq.

India-Pakistan Crises under the Nuclear Shadow: The Role of .,Not only was Raja Zafar considered close to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but there was also a general impression in political circles that he had connections within the powerful military establishment, but he was certainly not part of the nuclear decision-making structure.


"Pakistan can use the nuclear option to protect its territory, security and sovereignty," he said.

This statement was made on the occasion of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's visit to China and many international experts said that this statement was made to please the people inside the country.

But the message was clearly understood in the Indian capital, New Delhi, where the Indian prime minister, defense minister and national security adviser all responded and sought to downplay the nuclear threat from Pakistan.

Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses,Timothy De Hoit, Associate Professor of Strategic Affairs at the US Naval War College in Washington DC, wrote in his analytical work on the Kargil War, "Kargil: A Nuclear Dimension" that there were reports that Pakistan and The two Indian prime ministers had stepped up their nuclear preparations and were about to allow the use of nuclear weapons.


"In a private meeting, President Clinton asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif if he was aware that his (Pakistani) army was preparing to use nuclear-armed missiles," Professor Hewitt wrote in the analysis. Allegedly, Nawaz Sharif was content to say that India was doing the same.

According to Professor Hewitt's analysis, the Kargil crisis was a nuclear crisis in every way, with both threatening to attack each other with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Crisis Stability in South Asia,According to Professor Hewitt, however, it is not clear what role nuclear weapons actually played in the decision-making of the two countries.


And if we talk about the tensions of 2002, then India moved its troops with the stated purpose of putting pressure on the Pakistani army to stop the cross-border incursion into Indian-administered Kashmir and make it safe. To be kept

In June 2002, Indian military officials claimed a 53% reduction in cross-border intervention.

But despite the fact of the deployment of Indian Armed Forces on the global border and the stated purpose of the movement of troops, India has never said that cross-border intervention is completely over.


The Pakistani government refused to extradite to India 20 terrorists whom the Indian government had demanded be handed over to India.

However, President Pervez Musharraf did take action against five terrorist groups inside Pakistani territory and the leaders of these groups were arrested, their accounts frozen and their offices sealed.

Many international military analysts are of the opinion that the Indian government has not been able to decide on the response to provocations in the nuclear situation.

Immediately after the attack on the Indian Parliament, they started military mobilization, but for the next six months they failed to order the military leadership to take action to punish Pakistan.

Does this mean that Pakistan's threat of nuclear action worked and the Indian political and military leadership feared it and refrained from taking any drastic action? There is no clear and simple answer to this question. What is the view of Pakistan's traditional wisdom on this crisis?

As far as the involvement of nuclear weapons in the military crisis is concerned, many illusions have arisen in Pakistani society in this regard.

There are a number of myths or government-sponsored stories about Pakistan's nuclear program and concepts that have kept India from launching a conventional attack on Pakistan.

For example, a well-known story is that in 1986, Dr. AQ Khan's interview with an Indian journalist scared India from crossing the international border, in which he revealed that Pakistan had nuclear weapons. There is a similar story about the Kargil battle.

Security expert Air Marshal (retd) Shehzad Chaudhry said: "During the Kargil war, both sides knew they had nuclear weapons and the Indians did not cross the Line of Control just because they knew our nuclear capability. ۔

According to this type of security expert, the role of nuclear weapons in the 2002 military crisis was even more obvious. Shehzad Chaudhry said, “In almost the entire year of 2002, there was a full force of armed forces on both sides, but despite this, the two did not fight. Eventually, the Americans intervened and persuaded the two to retreat.

As far as people who are truly aware of Pakistan's nuclear policy are concerned, they are exposed to public threats made by unprofessional and unrelated government ministers and public figures during a military crisis or war. Statements reject the use of nuclear signals.

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